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Children as Projects and Persons: A Liberal Antinomy 
 
Suppose I said that I had a project, one that required a major investment 
of time, money, and energy (e.g., climbing Mt. Everest), and that this 
entitled me to a bigger than usual share of social resources, whether in 
the form of money (travel grants) or leisure (paid leave from work). Fur-
ther suppose that I was deeply committed to this project, both intellectu-
ally and emotionally, and found it difficult to imagine life without it; the 
project was not merely something I chose but something I was—it partly 
constituted my identity. Under such circumstances, should I be given any 
special treatment? Specifically, should I be entitled to a greater than 
normal share of social resources to support my project? 
 On one standard reading of liberalism, I should not be. Insofar as lib-
eralism is committed to “neutrality” toward “(justice-respecting) concep-
tions of the good life,” my share of resources should not vary with my 
plan of life and the particular ends and preferences associated with it, as 
liberal principles of justice properly take no notice of such variations—
be they across persons or with respect to a single person across time—
but rather focus on the development and exercise of those common moral 
powers (viz., rationality and reasonableness) that characterize free and 
equal citizens.1 In brief, I should adjust my plan of life to accord with my 
just share of social resources, not the other way around. As Rawls says in 
Political Liberalism: 
 
[G]iven their capacity to assume responsibility for their ends, we do not view citizens as 
passive carriers of desires. That capacity is part of the moral power to form, to revise, and 
rationally to pursue a conception of the good; and it is public knowledge conveyed by the 
political conception [of justice] that citizens are to be held responsible. It is supposed that 
they have adjusted their likes and dislikes, whatever they are, over the course of their 
lives to the income and wealth and station in life they could reasonably expect. It is re-
                                                 
 1See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 217-19, for a detailed discussion of liberal (notably 
Rawlsian) neutrality. Also see Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in Stuart Hampshire (ed.), 
Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 113-
43, at p. 127; and Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1987), pp. 44-47. 
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garded as unfair that they should now have less in order to spare others from the conse-
quences of their lack of foresight or self-discipline.2 
 
Unless my preferences, ends, and other features of my plan of life are 
viewed as “incapacitating” and truly involuntary (in which case they 
must be treated as a “medical or psychiatric” problem), I am to be held 
fully responsible for my plan of life and given no special allotments of 
money or leisure simply because I have chosen an especially expensive 
or time-consuming project; I must learn to live within the means that lib-
eral justice impartially provides.3 
 Suppose that I now reveal that my project is bearing and raising a 
child.4 I would suggest that the intuitions of nearly all liberals—even 
those firmly committed to neutrality as I described it above—will 
abruptly switch directions. To say this is not to deny that many liberals 
would still see child bearing and raising as a project, one implicating pa-
rental interests in creatively shaping and directing their progeny in a 
manner consistent with their own way of life, be it traditional or eclecti-
cally modern.5 Nevertheless, nearly all liberals would now concede that 
this “project” has a special status requiring a special allocation of social 
resources, such as money and leisure. The reasons for this special status 
would vary across different kinds of liberalism, but all would focus on 
children’s nature as (emergent) persons: Kantians, for example, would 
argue that children are incipient finite rational beings whom parents and 
other citizens have an important obligation to prepare for cosmopolitan 
citizenship and moral agency more broadly.6 In short, once my project is 
                                                 
 2John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 
186. 
 3Ibid., p. 185. 
 4I will assume throughout the paper that these activities are typically conjoined, i.e., 
that procreation and subsequent parenting are carried out by the same individuals, viz., 
biological parents. This has been true of virtually all societies, past and present, with 
exceptions normally limited to circumstances of abuse or incapacity, in which case adop-
tion is pursued. These activities could be systematically separated—as they are for the 
guardians in Plato’s Republic—but I do not think that this would be politically feasible in 
a liberal society, much less desirable. Consequently, any policy that makes raising a child 
cheaper (e.g., free school lunches) will encourage the bearing of children as well, be-
cause these activities are usually parts of a unified project. I will implicitly rely upon this 
connection throughout the paper. I will also assume that parents, given their responsibil-
ity for their children’s existence, are primarily responsible for ensuring that their children 
receive a fair share of social resources. Whether the government, like the co-signer of a 
loan, should be secondarily responsible and therefore obligated to make up the difference 
with a special allocation of resources (e.g., income-scaled educational vouchers) when 
parental contributions fall short is one of the central questions of this paper. 
 5For a defense of parental rights grounded on such interests, see Edgar Page, “Paren-
tal Rights,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1984): 187-204. 
 6See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. 
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revealed to be a (proto-)person, the liberal commitment to project-
neutrality is swiftly eclipsed by the liberal commitment to personhood 
and its development. 
 My purpose in this paper is not to say that there is anything necessar-
ily problematic about this abrupt shift in liberal intuitions in the final 
analysis—far from it—but instead to suggest that liberals have generally 
failed to appreciate the tension between their concurrent commitments to 
neutrality and personhood here and have consequently given insufficient 
attention to resolving it. To see this tension more clearly, consider the 
way the world might look from the perspective of a childless couple who 
have devoted their lives to mountain-climbing. This joint project, as I 
noted earlier, might be an expensive one, in terms of both money and 
commitment of time and energy; moreover, this project might be so im-
portant to them that it largely determines their identities as persons, that 
is, they find it difficult or even impossible to imagine their lives without 
it. If we were to confront them with another couple who had chosen a 
different but equivalently expensive and identity-implicating joint pro-
ject—bearing and raising a child—but who were receiving an array of 
special resources to support theirs (e.g., tax breaks, educational subsidies, 
paid leaves, and the like), could they not complain on impeccably liberal 
grounds that they were being discriminated against, that their childless 
way of life was being treated as a less valuable one? I don’t think we 
should be so quick to dismiss such complaints as selfish or otherwise 
antisocial: if special state support is provided for parenting projects but 
not for other kinds of projects (such as mountain-climbing) that can be 
just as demanding and all-consuming, then a case can surely be made 
that such support is nonneutral with respect to “(justice-respecting) con-
ceptions of the good life” and therefore prima facie inconsistent with lib-
eral principles of distributive justice. 
 I did not use the language of “perspective” above accidentally. Liber-
alism (or at least that subset of liberal theories endorsing neutrality) ar-
guably underwrites claims both for and against the special allocation of 
social resources to parenting projects, but from two distinct perspectives 
that are equally valid within liberalism. Viewed from one perspective—
that of project-choosing adult citizens—the special allocation of re-
sources to parenting projects looks suspect, because it contravenes the 
liberal prescription of neutrality toward “(justice-respecting) conceptions 
of the good life.” The innumerable subsidies for parenting projects, 
whether they are directed at parents (e.g., Australia’s “baby bonuses”) or 
                                                                                                             
Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 429-30 (Ak. 6:280-
282); and Tamar Schapiro, “Childhood and Personhood,” Arizona Law Review 45 (2003): 
575-94. 
558 Robert S. Taylor 
 
 
children (e.g., free health care or education), reduce the cost of parenting 
projects relative to other kinds of personal projects, skewing choice in 
favor of both parenting and the particular kinds of satisfaction and self-
development that are associated with it. Seen from another perspective—
that of person-cultivating adult citizens—this allocation appears to be 
unproblematic, at least in principle, due to society’s weighty obligation 
to develop children into good citizens and responsible moral agents. Lest 
these two perspectives seem to be facets of the rational and the reason-
able, respectively—which might suggest the priority of the latter over the 
former—notice that both perspectives are at base ones of respect: the 
former, of equal respect for project-choosing adult citizens, whose treat-
ment is to be grounded upon their common moral capacities, not their 
varied plans of life; the latter, of respect for the incipient moral and po-
litical agency of children.7 
 This tension between liberal commitments to neutrality and person-
hood can be described more formally as an “antinomy,” that is, a conflict 
between two equally authoritative conclusions: 
 
Thesis (neutrality): Parenting projects should not receive a special alloca-
tion of resources. 
Antithesis (personhood): Parenting projects should receive a special allo-
cation of resources. 
 
Without making too much of the parallels between this liberal antinomy 
of parenting and Kant’s own antinomies of reason, I do want to point out 
a few similarities, ones that will suggest a way forward.8 First, there ap-
pears to be a “conflict of [liberal] reason with itself” here: commitments 
                                                 
 7I follow Rawls’s understanding of the rational and reasonable: rationality is “the 
capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good,” and rea-
sonableness is “the capacity for an effective sense of justice.” John Rawls, Collected 
Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 312. The tension I have 
identified here is related to one previously identified by Adam Swift, who points out that 
equality of opportunity for parents (getting “an appropriate return to their responsible 
[parenting] choices” and investments) will most likely yield inequality of opportunity for 
children (for whom varied investments mean varied prospects in life). He calls this a 
“fundamental incoherence in the idea of equality of opportunity.” See his “Justice, Luck, 
and the Family: The Intergenerational Transmission of Economic Advantage from a 
Normative Perspective,” in Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and Melissa Osborne Groves 
(eds.), Unequal Chances: Family Background and Economic Success (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2005), pp. 256-76, at pp. 267-68. 
 8For a brief but very informative discussion of Kant’s antinomies of reason, see 
Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000), pp. 58-60. Obviously, my liberal antinomy of parenting differs from 
Kant’s antinomies in many ways, e.g., it is normative, not cosmological, and its pair of 
claims is not established through indirect proof. This being said, the similarities are in-
structive, or so I hope to show. 
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to neutrality and personhood, both of which have an unimpeachable lib-
eral provenance, seem to yield diametrically opposed conclusions regard-
ing special support for parenting.9 Second, there is every reason to think 
that the thesis and antithesis “may both be true” in a certain sense, given 
the powerful arguments for them we have examined, and rejecting either 
would compromise key liberal values, viz., neutrality or personhood.10 
Finally, in view of the preceding items, a genuine solution to the antin-
omy must synthesize thesis and antithesis: it should re-establish the unity 
of liberal reason by a reconciliation of the rival claims, one that “takes on 
board aspects of thesis and antithesis without fully endorsing either posi-
tion,” in the words of Katrin Flikschuh.11 
 In the remainder of the paper, I will try to achieve just such a synthe-
sis, one that pays due respect to the powerful intuitions underlying both 
thesis and antithesis but that rejects an implicit assumption that both 
share (or so I shall claim), viz., a belief that liberal justice involves ex-
tensive procreative liberty. By suggesting that procreation and subse-
quent parenting should be limited by law to those adult citizens who have 
demonstrated the relevant parenting capacities—intellectual, emotional, 
and especially financial—I follow in the footsteps of liberal theorists 
John Stuart Mill and Hugh LaFollette.12 Unlike them, however, I argue 
for such limits not as a way to avert harm to children and third parties but 
rather as a way to reconcile the divergent liberal intuitions about neutral-
ity and personhood discussed above and thereby restore the unity of lib-
eral reason; I add a Kantian argument, in short, to the existing utilitarian 
ones in favor of restricting procreation. 
 Before defending this solution to the antinomy, though, I should try to 
respond to two key objections to the thesis and therefore to the very exis-
tence of the antinomy. The first of these will claim that parenting pro-
jects are involuntary, the product of powerful natural instincts, and so we 
                                                 
 9Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 524 (A516/B544). 
 10Ibid., p. 532 (A532/B560). 
 11Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, p. 124. There might be other 
such antinomies present in liberal theory. For instance, state support for the arts may 
produce an antinomy based on dueling commitments to neutrality and excellence, the 
latter of which is prized by such liberals as Humboldt, Mill, and Raz. This “antinomy of 
the arts” would differ from the antinomy of parenting in at least one important respect, 
though: whereas the former’s “horns” appear to be endorsed by different brands of liber-
alism (the deontological and perfectionist brands, respectively), at least one brand of 
liberalism endorses both of the latter’s horns: deontological (especially Kantian) liberal-
ism. This heightens the contradictions, so to speak, if only within the deontological brand. 
 12J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), pp. 117, 120; and Hugh LaFollette, “Licensing Parents,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 9 (1980): 182-97. Also see Sarah Conly, “The Right to Procreation: Merits 
and Limits,” American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2005): 105-15. 
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cannot be held responsible for choosing such projects; as a result, the 
preconditions for neutrality are not met and the thesis does not hold. The 
second of these objections will claim that although parenting projects are 
voluntary (contra the first objection), they are also obligatory, so neutral-
ity toward them is no more appropriate than neutrality toward justice it-
self—again, the thesis does not hold. I will find the first objection to be 
almost entirely uncompelling, and I will demonstrate that the arguments 
that are currently available (outside a religious framework, at least) to 
support the second objection are either too weak or too underdeveloped 
to overturn the thesis. 
 
 
First Objection to the Thesis: Involuntary Parenting 
 
One of the most powerful human instincts is the drive to reproduce, and 
in most nations this drive is reinforced by familial, social, and political 
pressures. Even in Europe, with its very low fertility rates, the over-
whelming majority of women will bear at least one child during their 
lifetime: the percentages vary from 74% in Germany to 92% in Russia.13 
Given this potent, even reinforced procreative drive, it seems misleading 
to say that parenting projects are “voluntary” in the same way, or at least 
to the same degree, as mountain-climbing projects, for example. Insofar 
as parenting projects are involuntary, though, neutrality is inappropriate. 
Recall that neutrality is premised upon our (rational) capacity to assume 
responsibility for our ends and therefore adjust our plan of life to accord 
with our just share of social resources, not the other way around. If we 
are compelled by natural instinct to include parenting in our plan of life, 
though, our capacity for rationality is being circumvented, and the pre-
conditions for neutrality fail to be met. Parenting is then a circumstance 
rather than a choice, to use the language of luck egalitarianism, and the 
state is consequently justified in treating it differently from other, more 
genuinely voluntary, projects. 
 Reasonable people will disagree in their assessment of the voluntari-
ness of parenting, but I do not find this claim of involuntariness to be 
particularly persuasive—except for the important case of women in illib-
eral societies who are denied not only basic liberties (sometimes includ-
ing negative procreative ones) but also reasonable employment opportu-
nities and who consequently cannot be understood to engage in genu-
                                                 
 13“Europe’s Population: Suddenly, the Old World Looks Younger,” The Economist, 
June 14, 2007. The Mediterranean and central and eastern European countries have espe-
cially low fertility rates: they are usually below 1.5 and thus far below the replacement 
level of 2.1. For comparison’s sake, 85% of American women bear at least one child 
during their lifetime. 
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inely voluntary childbearing. Human beings struggle to tame a host of 
powerful natural instincts that are the result of millennia of evolutionary 
pressure, including those for material acquisition, nepotism, domination, 
and violence.14 As a general rule, however, we continue to hold people 
responsible when these strong drives lead them to infringe principles of 
justice; exceptions are usually made only when these drives are so “inca-
pacitating” that they constitute a “medical or psychiatric” problem.15 The 
procreative drive is no different: it is unclear why individuals cannot 
rightly be expected to limit their reproduction to be consistent with their 
just share of social resources—even if this requires them not to repro-
duce.16 
 Such self-control might at first sight seem possible only for the clois-
tered or saintly, but a second look at the European statistics I provided 
earlier suggests otherwise. Anywhere from 8% (Russia) to 26% (Ger-
many) of European women manage to bear no children over their life-
times, so the idea that the procreative drive circumvents our rational ca-
pacities is simply a myth. Were parents to carry the full costs of bearing 
and raising children, moreover, one would expect these numbers to be 
even higher. Granted, the German number is unusually high and appears 
in part to be the result of recently evolved cultural norms: one survey 
found that “a fifth of young German women (and even more young men) 
say that having no children is fine,” indicating a major drop in support 
for the ideal of the two-child family unit, which had previously remained 
high despite rapidly declining fertility rates.17 What this suggests, 
though, is that the procreative “instinct,” far from being strictly natural, 
is highly culturally mediated. Were states to reduce or even eliminate 
support for parenting and engage in educational efforts to make child-
lessness socially acceptable, thereby counteracting cultural reinforcement 
of the natural procreative drive, the voluntariness of parenting would be-
come increasingly evident. 
 
 
Second Objection to the Thesis: Obligatory Parenting 
 
Even if we assume that the thesis can survive the first objection, it faces 
another, possibly more fundamental, one: the idea that parenting projects 
                                                 
 14See E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), especially the last chapter, and On Human Nature (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), for a discussion of the evolutionary origins of 
various human behaviors, including antisocial ones. 
 15Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 185. 
 16I will return to this claim below in discussing “strains of commitment” objections to 
legal limits on procreation. 
 17“Europe’s Population.” 
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are voluntary but also morally obligatory. Weird as the idea may initially 
appear, suppose for a moment that parenting is not only an ethical duty 
but also a political one, grounded upon principles of right. Certainly this 
idea has precedents in the Western tradition, even in democratic polities: 
in his funeral oration, for example, Pericles treats bearing children to re-
place those who have fallen in battle as both a personal and a political 
necessity.18 If parenting projects are obligatory in this way, then neutral 
treatment is not required: neutrality applies only to “(justice-respecting) 
conceptions of the good life,” but if procreation is a political duty, then 
conceptions that exclude it are not justice-respecting and have no legiti-
mate claims to impartial treatment. Under this set of assumptions, neu-
trality is no more appropriate in the case of parenting than it is in the case 
of developing and exercising our moral powers. 
 What form might such a political duty to procreate take, and how 
could it be grounded in a secular-liberal political theory? On the first 
question, the duty might take strong or weak forms. The strongest form 
would be an enforceable individual duty to procreate, which might entail 
any number of policies from denial of family-planning services to coer-
cive insemination. Needless to say, such a duty would be hard to ac-
commodate within a liberal theory, especially a Kantian one like that of 
Rawls: among the basic liberties protected by his first principle of justice 
is “freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological 
oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the per-
son),” and such freedom would certainly require what have been called 
“negative procreative liberties, or rights not to reproduce.”19 A weaker 
form of such a duty—one that allowed negative procreative liberties—
might be accommodated, however: the enforceable individual duty to 
support procreation, be it directly (by bearing and raising children one-
self) or indirectly (by paying “child-support” levies or providing equiva-
lent personal services in lieu of procreation).20 One could interpret exist-
                                                 
 18Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis: Hack-
ett Publishing, 1998), p. 96: “On the personal level, those who come later will be a means 
of forgetting those who are no more, and the city will benefit doubly, both in not being 
left short and in security; for it is not possible for men to counsel anything fair or just if 
they are not at risk by staking their sons equally.” 
 19John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1971), p. 53; and David F. Wolf II, “Negative Procreative Liberties and Liberalism,” 
Philosophy and Social Action 23 (1997): 19-31, p. 20. Wolf rightly contends that these 
liberties are prerequisites both for our exercise of rationality in the selection of plans of 
life and for equality of opportunity, especially with respect to gender (ibid., pp. 20-23). 
 20Compare this duty to weak forms of the duty to defend one’s country in wartime: 
selective-service systems have often allowed citizens to buy replacements or, in the case 
of conscientious objectors, to provide support services to combatants (e.g., flying medi-
vac) or do alternative civilian service (e.g., working in a munitions factory). 
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ing local taxes on childless couples for support of primary and secondary 
education as an enforcement mechanism for such weak duties. Unless we 
can explain how these duties flow from a secular-liberal political theory, 
though, these levies will look like a form of discrimination against the 
childless and their conception of the good life, just as the thesis main-
tains.21 
 Turning to the second question, let us begin with the following quota-
tion from David Archard and Colin Macleod. After considering the inter-
ests of parents and children themselves in parenting, Archard and Mac-
leod ask: 
 
But does the state also have an independent set of interests of its own in respect of chil-
dren? There is one very important reason for thinking that it does. This is that the state 
should secure the conditions for the reproduction of its institutions and their essential 
social, political, economic, and cultural preconditions. For instance, the state must surely 
ensure that the future population size of its citizenry does not become too great nor so 
small as to threaten the continued existence of society.22 
 
Insofar as the state in question is a democratic one, however, these inter-
ests are best thought of as the collective interests of the citizenry, parents 
and nonparents alike. Thus, the preservation of society over time—in 
fact, beyond our lifetimes—can be seen as a kind of public good benefit-
ing all currently existing citizens. Just as we may have an interest in en-
suring that our creative works and other accomplishments survive our 
deaths, so we may have a superior, even superintending, interest in pre-
serving democratic society, that magnum opus of the demos, into the far 
future. If so, then we would have a collective interest in maintaining so-
ciety’s preconditions, including an adequate population, and this interest 
could underwrite the weak but enforceable duty to support procreation. 
 Though plausible, these considerations seem too fragile and contin-
gent to do the work of underwriting the political duties in question, 
whose enforcement, we should recall, is not merely hortatory but physi-
cally coercive as well. Many citizens, after all, may care little or not at all 
for the preservation of political society after their deaths, seeing it solely 
as a useful mechanism for preserving their liberties and protecting their 
interests over their lifetime; in fact, this subset of citizens may and 
probably will overlap considerably with the subset of childless citizens. 
They may recognize and fully accept their enforceable obligation of jus-
                                                 
 21Religious political theories may have no difficulty grounding such a duty: see, for 
example, John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980), pp. 86-87. Such claims may not be endorsable by secular citizens, however, and 
thus could not serve as part of a political conception of justice for a liberal society. 
 22David Archard and Colin M. Macleod (eds.), The Moral and Political Status of 
Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 14 (emphasis added). 
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tice to sustain present political institutions but fail to see why they should 
be forced to maintain the conditions that enable these same institutions to 
survive their deaths. What we need is an argument addressed to such 
citizens that explains not only why they should take an interest in politi-
cal society’s continuation (and its procreative preconditions) after they 
have had their hour upon the stage, but also why externally enforceable 
duties of right flow from it.23 
 One approach is to argue that possible (i.e., not yet existing) future 
citizens will need to have these institutions in place to preserve their lib-
erties and protect their interests and that their preferences regarding these 
things should have moral weight for us here and now, leading us to se-
cure the future preconditions for such institutions. Richard Hare has ar-
gued that we should, in fact, tend to the interests of possible future citi-
zens, and—usefully for our purposes—he ties this obligation to a duty to 
support procreation: he states that “we ought to have regard to the prefer-
ences which those people would have, if they were brought into exis-
tence” (which would surely include preferences for the maintenance of 
political bodies to defend their interests) and then proceeds to claim that 
we should bring these people into existence, at least insofar as they 
themselves would have a “preference for existence over non-existence, 
which we may presume anybody to have who is happy.”24 His full argu-
ment for this claim is deceptively simple. Assume a happy person. Now 
presume that that person thinks his parents did the morally right thing by 
bringing him into existence. According to Hare’s theory of “universal 
prescriptivism,” which says that “one cannot with logical consistency 
make inconsistent moral statements about … situations which one admits 
to be qualitatively identical,” this person must “say the same about any 
situation resembling [his] case in its universal properties.”25 Therefore, 
he must say that any possible person, if he would be happy, ought to be 
brought into existence; in sum, we should not only make people happy 
but also make happy people.26 
 Hare’s argument for a duty to support procreation can be critiqued in 
many ways, three of which I will briefly assess here. First, it is unclear 
why a happy person, even if he prefers his own existence, needs to be-
lieve that his parents were morally right in bringing him into the world. 
                                                 
 23Arguments for unenforceable ethical duties to procreate are therefore insufficient: 
see, for example, Jeff Mitchell, “Why Have Children?” Contemporary Philosophy 24 
(2002): 42-46, esp. p. 44. 
 24Richard M. Hare, “Preferences of Possible People,” in Christoph Fehige and Ulla 
Wessels (eds.), Preferences (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 399-405, at p. 401. 
 25Ibid. 
 26Slogans of this sort can be traced to Jan Narveson, “Utilitarianism and New Genera-
tions,” Mind 76 (1967): 62-72. Just to be clear, Narveson himself believes that we have 
an obligation to make people happy but not to make happy people. 
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He could just believe that his creation (as opposed to his treatment once 
born) was a matter of moral indifference and, if so, no obligation to pro-
create would follow, because there would be no moral claim to universal-
ize. Hare realizes that such a reply is possible and asserts that it leads to a 
more general “amoral egoism,” but he confesses, “I am not yet satisfied 
with this way of dealing with” the reply.27 His dissatisfaction is under-
standable: even if one’s moral indifference to the creation of human be-
ings is amoral and egoistic, as Hare claims, there is no reason why this 
should lead to or even be correlated with a more general amoral egoism 
in the treatment of already existing persons, as they arguably have a dif-
ferent moral status from that of potential persons (even if Hare and others 
are right to think that the latter also have some moral status). 
 Second, Ulla Wessels has established that Hare’s method here, which 
infers “whether we ought to bring an individual into existence” from 
“what ex post an actual person rationally wants to have happened,” 
yields inconsistent moral judgments about possible people and their crea-
tion. Moreover, the only two ways to avoid these inconsistencies both 
rely upon a premise (“satisfied preferences ought to exist”) that is “so 
close to what [Hare himself] wanted to show that, even if we help our-
selves to the premise to save the argument, the argument will hardly be 
of use to us any longer”: satisfied preferences, after all, need human “car-
riers,” but our supposed obligation to produce such carriers is the very 
thing under question.28 Finally and most importantly, Hare is adamant 
that his argument generates an ethical but not a political duty, one operat-
ing within the prior bounds of justice: “if the right population and family 
planning policy is being followed, the number of children that ought to 
be born is born, and the preferences of those children are all the prefer-
ences that we can satisfy within the limits of the right policy.”29 Conse-
quently, it could not ground any externally enforceable duties to support 
procreation, at least not without amendment. Given that Hare’s argument 
for procreative obligations is the only one that is currently available 
within a (secular) possible-persons framework, they will have to be justi-
fied in some other way.30 
 Another possibility is to ground enforceable duties to support procrea-
tion on obligations that we have to existing citizens, whether young or 
                                                 
 27Hare, “Preferences of Possible People,” pp. 402-3. 
 28Ulla Wessels, “Procreation,” in Fehige and Wessels (eds.), Preferences, pp. 429-70, 
at pp. 450-68. Also see Christoph Fehige, “A Pareto Principle for Possible People,” in 
ibid., pp. 508-43, at pp. 537-38. 
 29Hare, “Preferences of Possible People,” p. 402; he also notes here that such policy 
“depends in turn, on large part, on factors irrelevant to the present argument.” 
 30As Fehige notes, support for procreative duties comes from the Bible (e.g., Genesis 
1:28) and from some people’s intuitions but from only one genuine argument so far: 
Hare’s argument. See Fehige, “A Pareto Principle for Possible People,” p. 517. 
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old. Insofar as there is no general difficulty in grounding obligations to 
our contemporaries, one might say that we have an obligation to ensure 
that their liberties and interests will still be protected after our deaths and 
must therefore secure the procreative preconditions for (near) future po-
litical society and its numerous functions. For example, “pay-as-you-go” 
state pension schemes (e.g., Social Security) usually require a positive 
rate of population growth in order to maintain solvency—though this is 
obviously not a sufficient condition.31 Also, low birth rates and a rapidly 
aging population may make it ever more difficult to defend a nation mili-
tarily, at least if existing borders are being preserved; Russia’s deepening 
demographic crisis, for instance, will in time lead to a military-
recruitment crisis.32 What these examples suggest is that even if we focus 
narrowly on the near future and the prospects for our contemporaries, 
especially younger ones, we may ultimately conclude that we have en-
forceable duties to support procreation for their sake. 
 Such an “overlapping generations” approach might do the trick if fur-
ther developed, but certain ambiguities and difficulties would need to be 
overcome. First, if these obligations to our contemporaries could be met 
in some way other than supporting procreation (e.g., transitioning to a 
fully funded pension scheme or a more capital-intensive military), then 
duties to procreate might themselves remain unsupported. Once our 
moral concerns are limited to just the next few generations, as they are in 
this approach, the need for population maintenance might disappear. 
Second, this approach needs to take into account that children generate 
not just external benefits but also external costs, such as increased de-
mands on limited, common-access resources like our air, water, parks, 
fisheries, and freeways.33 Children might still generate net external bene-
fits for our contemporaries, but accounting for these external costs may 
make alternatives to supporting procreation more attractive. Regardless, 
a great deal more work on this approach would have to be done before 
we could reasonably assess its promise—work that is beyond this paper’s 
scope. 
 Some of the arguments surveyed above are plausible, but none is 
compelling enough to definitively overturn the project-neutrality thesis. 
The idea that political society’s preservation over time can be thought of 
as a public good is much too weak to support something as strong as a 
                                                 
 31The seminal paper on this subject is Paul Samuelson, “An Exact Consumption-Loan 
Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money,” Journal of Political 
Economy 66 (1958): 467-82. 
 32See Judyth Twigg, “National Security Implications of Russia’s Health and Demo-
graphic Crisis,” PONARS Policy Memo #360, Center for Strategic and International  
Studies. 
 33This point is emphasized by Conly in “The Right to Procreation.” 
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procreative duty, as is Hare’s controversial possible-persons framework. 
The overlapping-generations approach is more promising but, given the 
existence of policy alternatives and the external costs of children, con-
siderably more work remains to be done on it. In view of the lack of con-
vincing arguments for enforceable procreative duties as well as liberal 
neutrality’s robust support for the thesis, I believe we should presume its 
validity. I will return to these matters in the paper’s conclusion. 
 
 
A Solution to the Antinomy: Conditional Parenting 
 
Assuming that the thesis can survive the preceding pair of objections, we 
are left with the earlier antinomy of parenting, which pits our liberal 
commitment to project-neutrality against our liberal commitments to per-
sonhood and its development. Can this antinomy be resolved in a way 
that not only pays due respect to the powerful intuitions lying behind 
these commitments but also reconciles them, thus restoring the unity of 
liberal reason? I pointed out particular parallels above between this lib-
eral antinomy of parenting and Kant’s own antinomies of reason, sug-
gesting that they may reveal a path toward a solution. One further paral-
lel should be mentioned here, one that Katrin Flikschuh emphasizes: “de-
spite their conflicting conclusions, thesis and antithesis in each antinomy 
share the same underlying premise ... The solution to the conflict de-
pends on a rejection of this premise and on the advocacy of a change in 
philosophical perspective.”34 I will now argue that both thesis and an-
tithesis of the liberal antinomy of parenting implicitly share a premise 
that needs to be rejected before a synthesis can be achieved, viz., a belief 
that liberal justice involves extensive procreative liberty. 
 The thesis treats parenting projects as essentially similar to other per-
sonal projects, which explains in part why neutrality is demanded: a lib-
eral state must treat all just life plans as equally deserving of respect and 
equally worthy of choice by its adult citizens. Choice has preconditions, 
however, and in order for that choice to be autonomous, those precondi-
tions must include a set of basic liberties.35 If parenting projects are no 
different from other projects, then the preconditions for their autonomous 
choice must be recognized and protected by a liberal state, and these 
would presumably include not only the negative procreative liberties 
(i.e., rights not to reproduce) that I discussed earlier but also positive 
                                                 
 34Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, pp. 59-60: thesis and antithesis 
of Kant’s antinomies of reason “each treat the world as an ‘existing whole’, i.e., as a 
thing-in-itself,” a premise that transcendental idealism rejects. 
 35For a defense of this proposition in a Rawlsian context, see my article “Rawls’s 
Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 31 (2003): 246-71. 
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ones (i.e., rights to reproduce). Preventing certain citizens from exercis-
ing their rights to reproduce on the grounds that they would do so incom-
petently would be no more justifiable—insofar as you believe the claim of 
similarity—than denying rights to free speech on related grounds.36 So 
the thesis implicitly supports extensive procreative liberties. 
 The antithesis rejects the claim of similarity, of course, because the 
project of creating an autonomous being has an entirely different status 
from that of other personal projects; in this regard, the thesis appears to 
be morally obtuse. In fact, the special status of this project, as we saw 
earlier, is what explains the special allocation of social resources to it. 
Why would this special allocation of social resources be necessary, how-
ever, given that parents could simply pay for the project out of their own 
pockets? The antithesis apparently anticipates that a subset of adults will 
bear children without being able to pay for them; given the overriding 
moral imperative to defend and cultivate children as incipient rational 
agents, the liberal state will have to make good the financial deficit when 
presented with such a fait accompli. The antithesis, in short, makes the 
same presumption that the thesis does: procreative liberties will be so 
extensive, heedless of the financial capacities of potential parents, that 
special allocations of social resources will prove necessary.37 
 By denying this shared premise of extensive procreative liberty—
specifically, by limiting procreation and subsequent parenting to those 
adult citizens who have demonstrated the relevant parenting capacities, 
intellectual, emotional, and especially financial—we may be able to sat-
isfy the concerns of both “horns” of the antinomy, though not without 
modest modifications to them. The main concern of the thesis can be met 
if the liberal state requires its adult citizens to pay for their parenting pro-
jects out of pocket; in this way a level playing field is created among per-
sonal projects, so to speak, thereby satisfying the criterion of project-
neutrality. The claim of similarity among projects made by the thesis 
cannot be sustained, however, given the very special status of the parent-
ing project. One implication of this status is that extensive (positive) pro-
creative liberty cannot be granted: were it granted without regard to fi-
nancial capacity, the state would be forced to step in with financial sup-
port for low-income parents, but this would violate project-neutrality. 
Thus, to maintain the conditions of neutrality demanded by the thesis, its 
implicit commitment to extensive procreative liberty will have to be 
                                                 
 36As Hugh LaFollette has opponents of parental licensing argue, “people have a right 
to have children, just as they have rights to free speech and free religious expression” 
(“Licensing Parents,” p. 186, emphasis added). 
 37Although I am focusing on financial criteria here for simplicity of exposition, the 
availability of “leisure” time for parenting is also an important criterion, one requiring 
flexible careers, which are hard to find in the U.S. (versus Europe). 
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weakened, perhaps substantially. 
 The main concern of the antithesis can be met if the liberal state acts 
as a final guarantor of the child’s survival (e.g., adequate nutrition and 
shelter) and development (e.g., education and emotional support). The 
antithesis’s proposed means for doing this—viz., the special allocation of 
social resources—is difficult to square, however, with the project-
neutrality to which the thesis is committed. Fortunately, another means is 
available: instead of allocating extra social resources to parenting pro-
jects, the state can screen those who intend to undertake such projects to 
guarantee that they have the requisite parental capacities, financial and 
otherwise, so that the liberal state is not forced to remedy any deficits 
after the fact in violation of project-neutrality. To accomplish this end, 
however, procreative liberty will have to be restricted to qualified adult 
citizens. 
 We can reach this conclusion by a slightly different path as well, one 
that utilizes Rawls’s distinction between “neutrality of aim” (state poli-
cies are neutral so long as they are not intended to “favor or promote any 
particular comprehensive doctrine rather than another”) and “neutrality 
of effect or influence” (state policies are neutral so long as they do not 
render it “more likely that individuals accept any particular conception 
rather than another”).38 The antithesis can plausibly claim to be neutral in 
aim, as its backing for parenting projects is not intended to encourage 
such projects vis-à-vis other projects but rather to protect and support 
(already existing) children.39 In order for the thesis to have purchase, it 
must maintain that neutrality of aim does not exhaust the meaning of lib-
eral neutrality, and the accommodationist instincts of many if not most 
liberals do in fact suggest a wider meaning: whether the issue is carving 
out exceptions in conscription laws for Quakers, compulsory school-
attendance laws for the Amish, or drug laws for native users of peyote, 
the presumed neutral aim of these laws does not insulate them from criti-
cism on grounds of disproportionate impact. Were subsidies to parenting 
projects the only means available to help children, we might have to ac-
cept the disproportionate impact as regrettable but unavoidable. As the 
proposed solution to the antinomy suggests, however, there is an alterna-
tive means available: granting positive procreative liberty only to quali-
fied adult citizens. Producing a complete theory of liberal neutrality is 
obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but surely it would include 
some rule specifying that where two or more feasible and effective 
means are available to secure some important public end, those with 
                                                 
 38Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-93 (emphasis added). 
 39The fact that existing subsidies for parenting projects are not, in fact, neutral in 
aim—their enabling legislation is frequently quite explicit about encouraging births—
does not rule out a suitably neutral justification, such as the one that I offered above. 
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highly disproportionate effects should be rejected or at the very least re-
considered. (I will return shortly to the contentious issues of feasibility 
and effectiveness.) 
 Before continuing to practical concerns, I want to respond to a possi-
ble objection at this stage: namely, that the proposed “synthetic” solution 
does not reconcile thesis and antithesis but rather affirms the thesis and 
rejects the antithesis. The reconciliation attained admittedly leans in fa-
vor of the thesis, but the antithesis is not thereby rejected—far from it. 
First, the solution meets the central concern of the antithesis, viz., guar-
anteeing the survival and development of the child, so its spirit is cer-
tainly preserved. Second and maybe more to the point, its letter is pre-
served in small part as well because under the proposed solution the state 
commits itself to (a) creating a legal framework for screening, monitor-
ing, and disciplining parents, and (b) assuming financial responsibility 
for the child in extreme cases (e.g., licensing noncompliance, when com-
bined with threats to the health, safety, and welfare of the child).40 These 
two commitments require a special allocation of social resources not 
made for other sorts of personal projects; as a consequence, full neutral-
ity across projects is not achieved and in fact cannot be achieved. The 
thesis, in short, has to accommodate a minimal nonneutrality so that the 
spirit and (to a lesser extent) the letter of the antithesis can be preserved 
and reconciliation achieved—albeit on terms favorable to the thesis. 
 How might the screening of parents work in practice? Hugh LaFol-
lette has proposed that we license parents, granting reproductive rights 
only if they meet “certain minimal standards of child rearing. Parents [a] 
must not abuse or neglect their children and [b] must also provide for the 
basic needs of their children.”41 Prospective parents would be given psy-
chological tests inter alia to determine whether they would be likely to 
abandon or abuse their children; those who had especially bad scores 
would be refused a license.42 Given the high probability of deception on 
the part of applicants, less manipulable measures might also be used, 
such as records of past criminal activity, institutionalization for mental-
health problems, and so on. Such screenings would make it less likely 
that the state would have to carry out expensive interventions at a later 
date. 
 Virtually all of LaFollette’s discussion focuses on the [a] criterion and 
                                                 
 40The focus here on compliance, enforcement, and so on, does not necessarily take us 
outside the realm of ideal theory: as Rawls suggests, “we need an account of penal sanc-
tions, however limited, even for ideal theory. Given the normal conditions of human life 
such arrangements are necessary” (A Theory of Justice, p. 212). I will have more to say 
on the details and feasibility of enforcement as well as on nonideal conditions in a moment. 
 41LaFollette, “Licensing Parents,” p. 187. 
 42Ibid., pp. 190-92. 
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on ways to ensure that prospective parents are likely to meet it. The [b] 
criterion is equally important, however, for the reasons sketched above: 
parents with inadequate financial resources will become a burden on the 
state, forcing it to violate project-neutrality. Accordingly, prospective 
parents will have to be screened not merely for propensity to “abuse or 
neglect” but also for financial incapacities. John Stuart Mill defended 
such vetting as within the purview of a liberal state: 
 
It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of 
being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, 
is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society … The laws 
which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show 
that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of 
the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on 
local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty.43 
 
I will return below to Mill’s reasons for thinking such limitations consis-
tent with liberty. For the moment, note that financial tests would likely 
be more objective and reliable (because less liable to manipulation) than 
psychological ones, assuming that income-tax records and so on are ac-
cessible. Prospective parents’ financial fortunes may change after the 
birth of their child, of course, which might expose the state to the very 
financial liability it sought to avoid by screening. Performance bonds 
compulsorily purchased by qualified parents could help to insulate the 
state from (most of) this liability, though: candidate parents who met the 
psychological and financial criteria could be required in addition to make 
a payment to a “surety” (whether a private insurer or the state itself) to 
guarantee performance of parental duties, with the surety assuming re-
sponsibility in case of an unexpected financial catastrophe; payments 
would vary according to risk criteria, as in insurance contracts generally.44 
 These proposals may have an air of unreality about them given cur-
rent practices in liberal societies, and no doubt their adoption would ini-
tially face fierce resistance. This resistance would originate in large part 
from the widely held belief that reproduction is a fundamental human 
right and that its denial would be despotic. This belief is even enshrined 
in U.S. constitutional law: in Skinner v. Oklahoma, which addressed ster-
ilization of the mentally retarded, the Supreme Court declared procrea-
                                                 
 43Mill, On Liberty, pp. 117, 120. 
 44The requirement of posting a performance bond might substitute completely for 
other financial criteria. Religious groups, for example, might be willing to assume a great 
deal of financial responsibility for members’ children; if so, additional financial criteria 
(e.g., income thresholds) might not be needed, which would allow poor but communally 
rooted adults to reproduce. The best mix of financial criteria for securing children’s sur-
vival and development would vary by time and place, naturally, and would have to be 
discovered through experimentation and the accumulation of institutional experience. 
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tion to be “one of the basic civil rights of man.”45 LaFollette and Mill 
both reject this belief on utilitarian grounds: procreation has the potential 
to cause immense harm to both the children thereby created and the lar-
ger society, and it can therefore be reasonably regulated, even denied to 
certain groups of citizens, just like any other dangerous activity.46 Such a 
conclusion is unsurprising, of course, as utilitarianism is not renowned as 
a rights-respecting moral theory, and any rights recognized by utilitarians 
are also “subject … to the calculus of social interests.”47 
 Kantian theories like Rawls’s justice as fairness might seem more 
inclined to recognize extensive procreative liberties, given both the prior-
ity assigned to liberty and the tight connection between these liberties 
and others explicitly included among the basic liberties (e.g., “integrity 
of the person”).48 As noted earlier, however, parenting projects and those 
liberties associated with it have a unique status in a Kantian framework 
because they involve the creation of incipient finite rational beings—that 
is, children—and therefore impose enforceable duties of right on both 
parents and the larger society; any rights that parents thereby gain over 
their offspring (e.g., to “manage and develop” them) derive entirely from 
these duties.49 No other projects or liberties have these features, which is 
why lumping them together with projects like mountain-climbing or lib-
erties like free speech—as both the thesis and constitutional law do—is 
simply a category mistake. 
 As for the alleged tight connection between positive procreative liber-
ties and other basic liberties plus related worries about government intru-
sion into the private sphere of sexuality, we should note that much de-
pends on the way the proposed restrictions on procreation are enforced. 
If coercive contraception, sterilization, and abortion or related measures 
were being considered, then we might reasonably ask whether procrea-
tive liberties lay within the shadow of other, more basic liberties. No lib-
eral state, though, could rightly contemplate utilizing these methods. If 
less personally intrusive techniques were used, on the other hand, it is 
unclear that any basic liberties would be implicated: for example, fines; 
placing noncompliant households under supervision (in order to ensure 
proper treatment of the children and impose additional labor on adult 
members to defray its costs); or, as a last resort, removing children from 
                                                 
 45Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 46Mill, On Liberty, pp. 14, 120; LaFollette, “Licensing Parents,” pp. 186-87. LaFol-
lette’s comparison of the harm-based reasons for licensing drivers and doctors versus 
parents is highly illuminating: see ibid., pp. 182-86. Critics of parental licensing often 
object to the “prior restraint” involved but don’t seem to notice it in these other cases. 
 47Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 4. 
 48Ibid., p. 53. 
 49Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 429-30 (Ak. 6:280-281). 
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the homes of unlicensed parents and putting them up for adoption.50 
Some combination of these methods and others could maintain a rea-
sonably high level of compliance without jeopardizing central personal 
liberties. 
 Some may doubt the prospect of widespread compliance without dra-
conian enforcement measures, however. As noted earlier in the paper, the 
procreative instinct is a strong one, and the emotional tie between parents 
and their offspring is even stronger. Preventing procreation by the men-
tally and emotionally disturbed would be difficult enough, but trying to 
do so with the poor would be doubly so, given the potentially large class 
of citizens involved. In the adoption of any policy, such as parent licens-
ing, we must consider what Rawls calls the “strains of commitment”: we 
must avoid committing to political principles and laws that, given our 
“general knowledge of human psychology,” we realize will be extremely 
difficult if not impossible for a substantial part of the population to com-
ply with.51 The concern here is that the licensing of parents might be just 
this sort of law, one that fails to generate the common and willing com-
pliance needed by a liberal state and that therefore requires harsh en-
forcement measures inconsistent with liberal principles.  
 The first thing to note about this concern is that much hinges on the 
condition of the poor. I have been operating under the assumption that 
parental licensing would be carried out against a background of eco-
nomic egalitarianism, under which the poorest members of a society 
would be guaranteed at least a decent social minimum income, perhaps a 
maximized one as consistent with Rawls’s difference principle. With 
good financial planning and frugality, such a social minimum would per-
mit all “poor” citizens who were otherwise qualified to become parents, 
although other personal projects might have to be curtailed or even 
dropped as a consequence. With the realistic prospect of becoming par-
                                                 
 50LaFollette, “Licensing Parents,” p. 193. I put these techniques in order of increasing 
severity so as to suggest an “escalating” enforcement strategy, with the removal of chil-
dren as a last resort not only because of the resistance it would provoke (see below) but 
also due to the emotional suffering that both parents and children would experience as a 
result. As I noted above, the reconciliation of thesis and antithesis involves incorporating 
the latter’s dominant concern for the child’s welfare and development; this concern must 
therefore guide both the form and enforcement of licensing. Hence, separations of parents 
and children must be minimized, consistent with reasonable deterrence. 
 51Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 126, 153. These “strains,” as Rawls explains else-
where, can take both strong and weak forms: the strong form is for us to become “sullen 
and resentful,” leading perhaps to “violent action in protest against our condition,” 
whereas the weak form is for us to become “withdrawn and cynical,” not able to “affirm 
the principles of justice in our thought and conduct … Though we are not hostile or rebel-
lious, those principles are not ours and fail to engage our moral sensibility.” See John 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), p. 128. 
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ents, lower-income citizens would be more likely to obey the licensing 
provisions, on the understanding that even if they could not qualify now, 
they would be able to do so at some point in the future with fiscal disci-
pline, hard work, and general (i.e., project-insensitive) income supple-
ments from the state. 
 I think it is fair to say that these background conditions fail to hold in 
the U.S. today: we are under nonideal conditions due to a failure of our 
distributive institutions to abide by liberal-egalitarian principles of justice 
on virtually any understanding of those principles. Consequently, a non-
trivial segment of the population lacks any realistic prospect of being 
able to self-finance a parenting project, no matter how hard they work 
and how much they save. Under such nonideal conditions, the special 
allocation of social resources to parenting (such as tax breaks, educa-
tional subsidies, and paid leaves) might be viewed as a second- or third-
best approach to redistribution, regrettable due to its violation of project-
neutrality but perhaps unavoidable given existing public sentiments 
against general income supplements but in favor of parenting supple-
ments. I concede, in short, that we should be extremely hesitant to im-
plement a parental-licensing system when the background conditions for 
distributive justice, institutional and otherwise, are not present, as this 
would bear an uncomfortable resemblance (in effect if not in detail) to 
sterilization of the poor. 
 Assume for a moment, however, that these background conditions 
exist, at least in some approximate way, in certain countries in the world 
today (e.g., Scandinavian nations) and might exist in the U.S. in the me-
dium- to long-term.52 Under such (near) ideal conditions, would strains 
of commitment still rule out licensing parents? I doubt it, though again 
reasonable people might disagree. The enforcement burden under these 
conditions would be much more manageable, and though the mentally 
and emotionally disturbed would continue to present a problem, the 
poorer members of society could be expected to comply willingly, espe-
cially if cultural norms evolved in a reinforcing manner. As I discussed 
above in the involuntary-parenting section, there is some evidence from 
Germany that the procreative drive is at least in part culturally mediated. 
If this is the case, then educational efforts by the liberal state to render 
childlessness a socially acceptable lifestyle alternative rather than a per-
                                                 
 52Of course, Scandinavian countries tend to give generous aid to parenting projects. 
As I have just implied, though, such aid is especially difficult to justify: parenting sup-
plements may be justifiable in the United States only because general income supple-
ments lack political support, but in these countries such support is present. As a conse-
quence, all of their parenting supplements should be converted into general income sup-
plements as part of the transition to a parental-licensing system—if the argument of this 
paper is sound, that is. 
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ceived misfortune or even a curse would lessen the pressure to reproduce 
and thereby enhance compliance. Such educational efforts might them-
selves seem to be an example of nonneutrality, with the state promoting a 
particular conception of the good life, but given that most liberal-
democratic states have long promoted parenting with both their words 
and deeds, they are better seen as a way to neutralize existing state-
induced biases. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I began this paper by arguing that a liberal antinomy of parenting existed: 
strong liberal intuitions militate in favor of both denying special re-
sources to parenting projects (on grounds of project-neutrality) and 
granting special resources to parenting projects (on grounds of respect 
for personhood and its development). After investigating and then setting 
aside a pair of objections to the first of these two claims, I proceeded to 
argue that they could be reconciled by rejecting a premise that is com-
mon to both—that liberalism necessarily involves a commitment to ex-
tensive procreative liberties—and endorsing the limitation of both pro-
creation and subsequent parenting to those adult citizens meeting certain 
psychological and especially financial criteria. I defended this argument 
against a variety of theoretical and practical concerns and suggested that 
it offered a Kantian alternative to Mill’s and LaFollette’s utilitarian ar-
guments for restricting procreation. 
 Given that parental licensing will conflict with many people’s consid-
ered convictions of justice, I will draw the paper to a close by reviewing 
three possible ways to avoid the force of its central argument. First, one 
might reject the thesis and the antinomy of which it is part by simply dis-
avowing liberal neutrality itself. As I noted early in the paper, not all spe-
cies of liberalism are committed to neutrality (e.g., utilitarian liberalism 
or the plural-perfectionist liberalism of Joseph Raz), and insofar as such 
a commitment leads to unpalatable policy conclusions such as parental 
licensing, one might be inclined to abandon it. Rather than rehearsing the 
arguments in favor of liberal neutrality, I will merely point out that while 
abandoning neutrality might be necessary to avoid the paper’s conclu-
sions, it is insufficient, as the utilitarian arguments for licensing remain. 
The fact that both utilitarian and Kantian forms of liberalism can be used 
to support the licensing of parents suggests that it might be a robust pol-
icy conclusion; those resistant to licensing should at least consider revis-
ing their policy convictions instead of giving up on liberal neutrality. 
 Second, one could recur to my earlier concession that state support 
for parenting projects might be seen as a second- or third-best kind of 
redistribution given conditions of noncompliance with liberal-egalitarian 
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principles of justice. If the poor are denied reasonable income supports 
by the state, then to deny them procreative liberties as well on the 
grounds that they cannot afford to raise children would be to add insult to 
injury. I find this kind of argument to be persuasive, but I would add that 
it fails to deflect much of my argument’s force, because background 
conditions of distributive justice are arguably present in some countries 
in Europe and could be present in the U.S. given the political will, and 
once those conditions are present the argument then applies with full 
force. In short, pointing out the existence of economic injustice in the 
U.S. or anywhere else can at best delay implementation of parental li-
censing; it does nothing to overturn the idea that it is a policy ideal to-
ward which we should work politically—in tandem, of course, with dis-
tributive reform. 
 Finally—and I think most promisingly—one could try to establish 
theoretical support for an enforceable individual duty to support procrea-
tion. As I noted in my discussion of the second, “obligatory-parenting” 
objection to the thesis, some variety of overlapping-generations argu-
ment might ground this duty, though numerous details would need to be 
fleshed out, including taking into account both the existence of alterna-
tive policy tools and the external costs of children. If such a duty to sup-
port parenting could be persuasively defended, the thesis would fall and 
the antinomy of which it is a part would vanish. Again, though, the utili-
tarian case for licensing parents would remain. Disconcerting though it 
might be, parental licensing is not an idea that will go quietly.53 
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